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BOOK REVIEWS

Global Emissions Trading:Key Issues ForIndustrializedCountries.
Edited By Suzi Kerr (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.,
2001. Pp. 288, $90.00 hardback)
Global climate change is one of the most challenging environmental
issues. While many environmental issues can be addressed by regulation
within one country, or through bilateral negotiations, climate change is
truly a global issue. Its causes are spread across the world, but its impacts
will differ significantly from one country to another. Further complicating
matters is our limited understanding of the socioeconomic effects of climate
change. While recent scientific evidence has concluded that human activity
is contributing to and will continue to contribute to a significant increase in
global temperatures over the next century, much less is known about the
socioeconomic effects of this increase in temperature.'
Despite these uncertainties, some things are clear. A large number
of people will be significantly harmed by climate change under current
trends. These people will suffer primarily due to the detrimental effects of
climate change on agricultural activities and to increased exposure to
disease.2 It is also clear that reductions of emissions by developed countries
alone will be insufficient to successfully combat climate change. Efforts to
reduce emissions will also be needed by developing countries.3 These
reductions by developing countries will probably need to be financed, at
least in part, by developed countries.4 It is also known that we currently do
not have the institutional structure necessary to combat climate change, nor
to finance these reductions.'
One of the institutions suggested for both reducing emissions and
enabling financial transfers is emissions trading. Under emissions trading,
total emissions from participants are "capped." When the sum of these caps
is less than the amount of emissions under no restraints, operation and
enforcement of an emissions trading system will result in a reduction of
emissions. Furthermore, if the caps are designed so that developed
countries will choose to purchase credits from developing countries,
payment for these credits will enable developed countries to partially
finance emissions reductions in developing countries. While emissions

1. See Henry D. Jacoby et al., Kyoto's Unfinished Business, in ECONOMIcS OFTHE
ENviRoNm~mr 517, 520-26 (R. Stavins ed., 2000).
2. William D. Nordhaus, Reflections on the Economics of Climate Change, in ECONOMICS OF
THE ENVIRONMENT 495, 498-501 (R. Stavins ed., 2000).
3. Jacoby et al., supranote 1 at 521.
4. Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architectures and Institutions, in ECONOMICS
AND POLICY ISSUES INCLIMATE CHANGE 137,140 (W. Nordhaus, ed., 1998).
5. ld. at 141.
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trading does present these opportunities, and the Kyoto protocol does
enable its use, the institutional details necessary for emissions trading to be
successful have yet to be determined.
Global Emissions Trading, edited by Suzi Kerr, takes many steps
toward developing global emissions trading institutions that can
successfully combat climate change. This text examines the development of
a trading system for greenhouse gases (GHG) among developed countries
based upon the system outlined in the Kyoto Protocol that is addressed to
"Annex B" participatory countries. Annex B includes developed countries
in Europe, North America, and the Pacific. It also includes some developing
countries in Europe, most notably Russia.6 If these countries ratify the
Protocol, they will commit themselves to keeping their emissions of GHG
below a certain amount from 2008 to 2012. This commitment is quantified
through a measure of assigned amount units (AAU), which is essentially
equivalent to one metric ton of CO2. In meeting their commitments,
countries can purchase AAU from other countries, who then have to reduce
their own emissions by the amount of AAU that is sold.
This text addresses the institutions needed to enable the use of a
trading system in this international context, including tracking systems for
permit holdings, compliance, and monitoring regimes, and the interaction
between domestic regulatory systems and an international trading system.
It also examines a number of complex issues associated with an
international trading system. Improper handling of these issues can greatly
reduce the effectiveness of a trading system for climate change.
Throughout the text, however, perhaps too much emphasis is
placed on the use of "trust-creation" to persuade developing countries to
join a future trading system. The authors seem to believe that prior
demonstration of significant emissions reductions is necessary to convince
some developing countries that other countries will uphold their
commitments to address global climate change. Furthermore, the authors
seem to believe that implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is the best way
to achieve this.
Reliance on trust-creation in this text, however, frequently results
in insufficient analysis of rationales based on the theory of national interest.
If analysis based on national interest is more appropriate, attempted
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol may lead to the creation of a number
of obstacles to successfully addressing climate change.
Other obstacles arise due to insufficient evidence about the actual
operation of an international GHG emissions market and the uncertainty of
actual cost savings from its operation. Overemphasis of the need for trust-

6. For a complete list, see S. KERR, GLOBAL EMISSIONS TRADING: KEY ISSUES FOR
INDUSTRIAuZED COUNTRIES, Appendix 1,225-26 (2000).
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creation through implementation of the Kyoto Protocol seems to lead the
authors to pass over these obstacles and to not closely examine alternatives
to the Kyoto Protocol. Under these alternatives, institutions could be
developed, trust could be created, and nonparticipating countries could
have strong incentives to join.
Nonetheless, while the emphasis of trust-creation and
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol may be problematic, the coverage of
the issues and the analysis provided by the authors of this text are very
helpful in understanding the complexities in operating a global emissions
trading program. Because emissions reductions by developing countries are
necessary for a long-term solution to global warming, and because
emissions trading may provide the best opportunities for inducing
developing countries to reduce emissions, this text will be very helpful in
constructing the institutions needed to address climate change.
The Development of Institutions and Other Issues Related to
International Emissions Trading
As noted in the text, "the key objective for implementing Kyoto
needs to be to build strong institutions."7 To help achieve this, the text
analyzes in significant detail a number of the institutions that will be
necessary to operate a global emissions trading system.
Perhaps the most important institution in any emissions trading
program is the institution that monitors and enforces compliance.
Compliance under emissions trading is necessary to achieve the
environmental objectives of the trading program. Effective compliance is
also necessary for the success of emissions trading itself, because, as the
authors note, if enforcement of permits is lax, countries will have little
incentive to participate in trading.8
In chapter 3, "Treaty Compliance as Background for an Effective
Trading Program," by Tim Hargrave, Suzi Kerr, Ned Helme, and Tim
Denne, and in chapter 4, "Additional Compliance Issues Arising from
Trading," by Suzi Kerr, the authors explain how we might develop an
institutional structure for assessing compliance and examine a range of
techniques for deterring non-compliance. These detailed analyses provide
a strong foundation for creating the enforcement mechanisms necessary for
an international emissions trading system. These include descriptions of the
basic procedures and personnel needed to construct a national GHG
accounting system and development of international accounting
procedures.

7.
8.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 44-45.
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These chapters also contain an informative analysis of personnel issues
involved in auditing national reports. One possible system would involve
primary audits conducted by third-party auditors that are hired by
individual countries, whose reports are then examined by an international
review team. Another system would have these third-party auditors
directly hired by the international review team. Important issues in auditing
include the timing of availability of data, coordination between different
levels of auditors, sovereignty concerns, and payment of auditors. The
comparison between these two systems offered here demonstrates how
these issues will necessarily arise in constructing an institution for assessing
compliance.
Furthermore, these chapters describe a number of techniques for
ensuring compliance. The authors point out that one of the most potent
techniques will be the loss of the right (o sell permits. Because permit sales
can bring in substantial revenues, denial of this right can be an extremely
effective technique in ensuring compliance. Other techniques include
suspension of treaty voting rights; bad publicity due to public release of lists
of non-compliers; economic sanctions; sanctions related to the operation of
the trading system, such as reduction of future allocations or requirement
of a compliance reserve; and buyer liability In order to be effective in
ensuring compliance, global emissions trading institutions will need this
combination of accurate monitoring of emissions and effective enforcement
mechanisms.
Operation of a global emissions trading system will also require an
institution for tracking the balances of emissions credits for each participant
country. As trades are made, balances need to be updated. Additionally,
when one country wishes to purchase credits from another country, the
buyer will want to know that the credits it intends to purchase actually
exist. An accurate tracking system will be necessary to provide evidence to
reassure the buyer.
While it might seem at first glance relatively simple to set up
account balances and update them according to trades, setting up the
institution to perform these tasks is much more complicated. Problems with
an inadequate tracking system led to significant problems during the
operation of the lead phase-down trading market in the United States. Slow
auditing of accounts led to mistakes in balances that possibly discouraged
some trading and encouraged some cheating by a small number of

9. Perhaps too much discussion is devoted to buyer liability, given that when the author
ranks the desirability of instruments to ensure compliance, buyer liability is ranked seventh
out of nine options.
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participants."0 Consequently, significant care should be exercised in creating
the tracking system to support global emissions trading.
One of the contributions of this text is to lay out some of the details
that a successful tracking system might include. In chapter 2, "An
International Tracking System for Greenhouse Gas Trading," Suzi Kerr
describes the basic institutional structure needed to successfully implement
a tracking system for international emissions trading. If permits were only
held and redeemed by individual governments, this system could be fairly
simple. If a government decides to allocate permits to actors within their
country, however, complex interactions between the national and
international accounts can result. For instance, rather than having country
A and country B trade, actor X in country A could trade with actor Y in
country B. Maintenance of accurate accounts thus becomes much more
difficult.
Basing the structure on the familiar institution of a private banking
system, Kerr describes a number of the details necessary for an international
tracking institution. These include details about who can hold an account,
who can initiate a trade between an account, the information recorded by
a bank, and who would operate the bank.
One detail that is not sufficiently addressed is the need for careful
security of this system. The large value of assets in a banking system
necessitates complex security. Similarly, the value of credits in a greenhouse
gas trading system will also necessitate complex security. The transaction
costs of this security will greatly increase the costs of operating this tracking
system.
In addition to compliance and banking institutions, interactions
between domestic regulatory systems and the international emissions
trading system will play a key role in the effectiveness of international
emissions trading. As noted previously by Hahn and Stavins," international
emissions trading systems will not necessarily be efficient when regulation
within an individual country is not incentive-based. Chapter 6, "Domestic
Greenhouse Regulation and International Emissions Trading," by Suzi Kerr,
goes beyond this theoretical point and demonstrates some of the complex
consequences of integrating different national regulatory systems through
an international emissions trading system.
Governments will maintain sovereignty over instrument choice for
domestic regulation of GHG. This chapter examines how different
instruments can achieve different objectives, and also examines the

10. See KERR, supranote 6, at 39.
11. See generallyRobert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, The Real Architectureof International
TradableAllowance Markets, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE DISCUSSION PAPER 99-30 (1999).
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consequences that arise in the interaction between an international trading
system and different domestic regulatory systems.
Countries that are concerned with achieving emissions reductions
at the lowest cost and with tight integration with the international trading
system might choose a domestic tradable permits system. Under this
system, it will be optimal for individual legal-entities, as opposed to the
government itself, to trade AAUs on the world market. 2
A number of complications arise, however, when the domestic
regulatory instrument is not a tradable permits system. One alternative
instrument that might be attractive to some countries because it would
provide another revenue source for the government is an emissions tax
system. 3 However, if the tax on GHG is less than the world market AAU
permit price, legal entities will have a strong incentive to sell an unlimited
amount of permits."4 This will inevitably lead to a situation in which the
country itself is not in compliance with its obligations under the
international emissions trading system. The chapter offers similar analyses
for other instruments such as emissions performance standards.
In addition to the analysis of the institutions associated with an
international trading system, the text offers analysis of some very tricky
issues associated with operating an international trading system. These
issues include the effects of different source categories, fair competition, and
joint implementation.
One very interesting result is offered in the chapter dealing with the
effects of market power on international trading. In this chapter, 5 Kerr
explains that, while we have known that market power presents problems
for marketable permit systems since Hahn,1 6 the international context leads
to significant differences in the effects of market power by buyers versus
market power by sellers. Exercise of market power by a country buying
permits will result in higher abatement costs for industries within that
country. These higher abatement costs will mean that this country's
industries will be at a competitive disadvantage internationally. Exercise of
market power by a country selling permits, however, will result in lower

Id. at 148.
13. The text refers to the idea that use of an emissions tax system could provide a "doubledividend" by enabling the government to reduce use of other, more distorting taxes. However,
a number of papers, such as Bovenberg and Goulder, have presented theoretical arguments
showing that this double-dividend may not exist. A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder,
Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analysis, 86
AMmUcAN EcoNoMc Rivisw 985 (1996).
14. KERR, supra note 6, at 151.
15. Id. at 186-188.
16. Robert W.Hahn, Market Powerand TransferablePropertyRights, 99 QUARTERLYJ. ECON.
753 (1984).
12.
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abatement costs for industries within that country, and these industries will
thus acquire a competitive advantage. These effects mean that it will be
much more likely for a selling country to exercise market power than a
buying country.
Problems Arising from an Emphasis on Trust-Creation and the Kyoto
Protocol
While making these and other contributions, the text seems to
overemphasize the idea of trust-creation to persuade developing countries
to join an international GHG emissions trading program. While it is
certainly important for participants in a program to believe that other
countries will uphold their agreed-upon obligations, this text seems to
argue that this trust can only be generated through the achievement of
extremely significant reductions in emissions by developed countries under
the target set by the Kyoto Protocol, five percent below 1990 emissions
levels.
This is unfortunate because this approach to constructing an
international emissions trading system may lead developed countries, such
as the United States, to decide that it is not in their interest to participate.
Additionally, even if developed countries agree to a trading system that
excludes most developing countries but requires major reductions by
themselves, this early effort by developed countries could generate
obstacles to participation by developing countries in the future.
Circumstances generated due to significant reductions by developed
countries could develop so that future participation would not be in the
interest of a number of developing countries. Because participation of both
developed and developing countries is necessary to effectively address
climate change, it may be appropriate to reduce the emphasis of trustcreation.
Throughout the text, the authors make it clear that they feel that
trust-creation is one of the most important objectives of an early
international emissions trading program. Immediately after noting that "the
key objective for implementing Kyoto... [is] to build strong institutions," 7
the next objective mentioned by the authors is trust-creation: "We need to
build trust and confidence."
The text's explanation of how trust is created, however, indicates
that this concept is not based on analysis of national interest: "Ultimately,
the cost of achieving the goals sought and the perceived equity of the relative
contributions of different states will limit the level of cooperation.""' In

17.
18.

Id.at 44.
Id.at 85 (emphasis added).
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contrast, a national-interest perspective would find that cooperation would
depend on analysis of costs and benefits in the context of risks and
uncertainties. Thus, analysis through the concept of national interest would
lead to more attention to the benefits for individual state actors, and
perhaps much less attention to equity issues.
This approach leads the text to give insufficient attention to
alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol. In one section discussing why the Kyoto
Protocol should be implemented,19 the authors note that "small differences
in emissions over the next twenty years will be swamped by any changes
in long-term emission trends." Furthermore, "the direct emission reduction
impact of compliance by Annex B countries in the first commitment period
will be relatively insignificant in the long run." Nevertheless, "achieving
compliance with short run targets [of the Kyoto Protocol] is a critical step
toward establishing confidence among both developed and developing
countries, [and] giving credibility to the commitments of the major players."
Thus, the authors seem to argue that trust-creation, and not benefits from
specific initial emissions reductions, is what will help justify the sacrifices
called for under the Kyoto Protocol. By focusing exclusively on the goals of
the Kyoto Protocol, however, the text neglects other alternatives.
Unfortunately, other alternatives may be necessary. Recent
announcements of opposition to the Kyoto Protocol by the George W. Bush
Administration in the United States have seriously jeopardized the
implementation of the Protocol. One of the primary concerns behind this
opposition is the possibility that compliance might result in extremely
significant economic disruption. Under the Kyoto Protocol, many
developed countries committed themselves to emission levels of around 93
percent of their 1990 emission levels, while participating developing
countries, in particular Russia, were mostly much higher, frequently around
100 percent. The text notes that a study by the IEA World Energy Outlook
has found that "under business-as-usual projections, emissions from
countries with economies in transition would already be some 150 million
tons of carbon below their 1990 levels, whereas OECD emissions [i.e.,
developed countries] would be more than 880 million tons higher than their
Kyoto objective." 0
Without trading, specific compliance with the targeted emission
levels would probably result in significant reductions in economic activity
in developed countries. From these projections, it therefore seems that in
setting targets for individual countries, Kyoto negotiators instead were
implicitly relying on the operation of the trading system to counteract the

19.
20.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 193.
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effects of targets that are too tight for developed countries." As pointed out
in the text, however, incomplete monitoring and enforcement within many
developing countries that are part of Annex B may lead to significant
restrictions in these countries' ability to trade. Furthermore, no trading
regime has ever approached the scope that GHG trading would reach, and
performance of this market is, therefore, very uncertain.
Developed countries may then find it extremely difficult to
purchase AAUs in order to overcome the difference between their Kyoto
target and emissions under reasonably achievable reductions. These
countries would then be faced with a decision to either significantly reduce
economic activity within their countries or not comply with the treaty.
Faced with this possibility, a number of countries such as the United States
could decide that ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is not in their own
national interest.
Meanwhile, even if developed countries did ratify the Protocol, and
were successful in reducing their emissions, this would not guarantee that
non-Annex B developing countries would be willing to join a broader
protocol to combat climate change. Early reductions by some countries may
lessen the incentive for other countries to join at a future point. Barrett
(1993) points out that "unselfish" unilateral action can "compromise
negotiations and lead, ultimately, to greater emissions than would have
occurred had both countries behaved 'selfishly.' Early reductions could
involve the installation of lower-emitting technologies. Because these
technologies would be in place during later negotiations for adding other
countries, these countries would be in a weaker position to convince the
new countries to join an expanded protocol and reduce their own
emissions. This is because the unselfish countries' threats would be less
credible. The greater the level of reductions by developed countries, the
stronger this effect is.
Additionally, operation of an international emissions market that
inludes a small number of countries will lead to domestic political
obstacles to the future participation of other countries. As noted by Jacoby,
et al., emission reductions in one country will raise production costs for
industries in that country.' The same industries located in a nonparticipatory country will gain a competitive advantage. They might then
undertake investments to capitalize on this advantage. Future participation
of that country, however, would eliminate this advantage. Accordingly,

21. The text realizes this possibility, because it includes an example of a country that "may
find it difficult to achieve compliance without trading." KERR, supranote 6, at 91.
22. Scott Barrett, InternationalCooperationfor
EnvironmentalProtectionin EcONOMcsoFTHE
ENvRONMENT 445, 445-63 (R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman eds., 1993).
23. Jacoby et al., supranote 1, at 522.
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these countries will face significant political opposition to joining an
expanded GHG trading system in the future. Similarly, this effect is
stronger when reductions by developed countries are more substantial.
Thus, ratification and successful operation of the Kyoto Protocol might
create trust that developed countries would continue to address climate
change. Despite this trust, however, developing countries might find
participation to be against their own national interest.
An Alternative to the Kyoto Protocol
It seems possible that a short-term climate change policy process
based solely on the Kyoto Protocol may cause a number of developed and
developing countries to not participate in the international policy. Because
long-term solutions to climate change will require the participation of both
developed and developing countries, we will need to consider alternatives.
One option would be to construct a more limited international trading
system in which countries would be required to have adequate inventories
of prior emissions and adequate monitoring for enforcement. This
requirement would greatly reduce the number of countries in Annex B that
would be eligible to participate. Only a few of the developed countries
would qualify. Because of the limited scope of this market, this system
would need to use much more feasible targets for the countries involved.
Additionally, other countries could be added to this market when they met
the inventory and monitoring requirements. In the meantime, emission
reduction efforts in other countries could be integrated into this system
through the Joint Implementation or Clean Development mechanisms.
There are several advantages to a much more limited market with
more feasible reduction targets. More feasible targets mean that developed
countries would be more likely to find it in their interest to join. These
higher targets will also reduce the disincentive against developing countries
joining later, as was discussed above.
Meanwhile, implementation of this system would begin the
institution-building process that is a necessary component of any long-term
strategy to address climate change. Furthermore, a higher standard for
inventory and monitoring will greatly increase the likelihood that these
institutions will achieve their goals.
Moreover, successful operation of this system should also generate
trust among participants and non-participants. More trust is generated by
setting modest targets and achieving them, than by setting more ambitious
targets and failing to achieve them.
On the other hand, this system would reduce participation of
developing countries during the early period. As noted by the text,
however, the right to sell permits in this system is an extremely valuable
right. By developing adequate inventories and monitoring systems, these
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countries could then join this market and gain this right. Financial support
for improving inventories and monitoring could be provided through Joint
Implementation projects, or by a special fund set up by the alreadyparticipating developed countries.
The amount of emissions reductions achieved during this early
period would be significantly lower than under the Kyoto Protocol. As the
text itself notes, however, and many others have noted, the amount of
emission reductions undertaken during this early period will have an
extremely limited impact on ultimate climate change. Increasing
participation by developing countries is much more essential for effectively
combating climate change. Thus, it seems that this system could offer many
advantages over implementation of the Kyoto Protocol as it now stands.
Meanwhile, it seems likely that its disadvantages could be overcome.
Conclusion
Global EmissionsTradingoffers extensive analysis of the institutions
needed to successfully operate an international emissions trading system for
GHG. It also provides significant insights into a number of issues that arise
in constructing an international trading system.
The text, however, may place too much emphasis on the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Many developed countries may find
ratification to be against their own national interest. Implementation may
also reduce the incentive of other developing countries to join a GHG treaty
in the future. Because any long-term solution to climate change will require
participation of both developed and developing countries, more
consideration of alternatives could have been offered. Nonetheless, reading
between the lines of the text suggests one possible alternative: an
international emissions trading system that starts with a much more limited
scope, but which uses much more achievable targets and even stronger
requirements for monitoring and enforcement.
It remains clear that some form of international trading system may
be necessary to combat climate change and to finance emission reduction
activities in many developing countries. The analysis offered by this text of
the issues faced in constructing and operating a trading system will greatly
contribute to the development of institutions needed to successfully operate
this system. As we learn more about the consequences of emissions and
more about opportunities for emission reductions, these institutions will
form the foundation of a flexible, long-term strategy to combat climate
change.
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